The Concept of Arms Race, Sino-Soviet-American Relations, and the Persian Gulf War Essay Example

The Concept of Arms Race, Sino-Soviet-American Relations, and the Persian Gulf War Essay â€Å"The Concept of Arms Race, Sino-Soviet-American Relations, and the Persian Gulf War† Political Science 170 Winter 2009 Dr. Kendall Stiles February 12, 2009 For centuries, and particularly during the last one hundred years, nations have sought to develop, manufacture, deploy, and improve weapons in reaction to the similar efforts of their adversaries. We call this an â€Å"arms race†. As defined early on by Gray, an arms race involves the following characteristics: [T]here should be two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing or improving their armaments at a rapid rate and structuring their respective military postures with a general attention to the past, current, and anticipated military and political behavior of the other parties. (Gray 1971, 40) Note that this definition excludes parallel arms acquisition by allies or neutrals, gradual and moderate increases in weaponry, or unilateral increases in weaponry that is unconnected to others’ behavior. On the other hand, the definition includes all types of weapons – conventional and nuclear, personal and strategic. Also, the definition includes both quantitative and qualitative improvements, implying that manufacturing and deploying obsolete weapons could be one way to engage in an arms race where the adversary is focused exclusively on developing new military technology instead. To what extent does this concept help us understand what took place in Sino-Soviet-American relations or the Persian Gulf War as described in as described in chapters 2 and 5 of the Stiles text, respectively? We will write a custom essay sample on The Concept of Arms Race, Sino-Soviet-American Relations, and the Persian Gulf War specifically for you for only $16.38 $13.9/page Order now We will write a custom essay sample on The Concept of Arms Race, Sino-Soviet-American Relations, and the Persian Gulf War specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer We will write a custom essay sample on The Concept of Arms Race, Sino-Soviet-American Relations, and the Persian Gulf War specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer I will argue that the material makes clear that arms racing was a central dimension of the great power relations of the first case, but does not feature as prominently in the Persian Gulf situation. Specifically, the Cold War was largely a conflict over nuclear deterrent capacity rather than direct military confrontation between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. , while in the case of the Persian Gulf War the United States injected itself in a regional conflict, mostly because Kuwait had been unable or unwilling to match Iraq’s military build-up and quickly succumbed to its forces once they attacked. This analysis offers a way to better understand that arms races are not the most unwelcome development in international affairs and may be preferable to alternative strategies. In 1945, the United States successfully tested an atomic bomb and a few weeks later dropped it on Hiroshima, Japan. It is interesting to note at the outset that although the weapon was originally developed in response to Germany’s threat, and was used against Japan, the principal target of America’s atomic and later nuclear arsenal for the next half-century would be the Soviet Union – an ally of the U. S. when the bomb fell on Japan. But by 1947 American and Soviet relations had deteriorated to the point that they each saw the other as its principal adversary. When the Soviet Union detonated an atomic device in 1949, it was clear to all concerned that this was a signal to the United States. It signaled that both superpowers had the capacity to eliminate each others’ major cities (although, as pointed out in the text, it would take some time before the Soviets would have the capacity to deliver the bomb to a distant target – see page 32). The development of the hydrogen (or nuclear) bomb by 1953 and the successful testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles by both sides by 1957 meant that the populations, industries, and military installations of both superpowers were vulnerable to nuclear attack. What took place in the first decade of the Cold War is a clear instance of an arms race. It was primarily technological in the early years and was both rapid and aggressive, as required by the definition. While one cannot speculate, it seems unlikely that the Soviet Union would have moved so quickly to develop nuclear-capable missiles had the United States not moved first. And these actions would not have been perceived as threatening without the generally hostile environment in which Americans and Soviets consolidated control over their respective spheres of influence and confronted each other’s allies in places like Korea and Berlin. At the same time, it is worth noting that although the rhetoric and posturing were openly hostile, the actions of both superpowers were relatively restrained. The Soviet Union chose not to attack West Berlin even though the presence of an American ally in the middle of a Soviet-dominated state was clearly irksome. Likewise, the United States was careful not to threaten Soviet territory in its war with North Korea and ultimately settled for a stalemate. In Cuba, where the United States might have benefited substantially from an invasion, it chose instead to adopt more tentative and non-violent means to pressure the Soviets to withdraw their missiles. It appears in retrospect that both states were deterred from attacking the other. And ultimately, the Cuban Missile Crisis seems to have prompted the two superpowers to meet face-to-face to negotiate how to prudently manage what was clearly a dangerous military situation. And, as we know, the Cold War ended with a fizzle rather than a bang as both sides accepted each other as rivals but not enemies and dramatically reduced their nuclear arsenals in the 1980s and 1990s. The implication of this story is that an arms race can – especially where nuclear-tipped missiles are concerned – lead world leaders to avoid rather than seek military confrontation. Knowing that her country cannot deliver a â€Å"knock-out punch† may prompt a leader to pursue non-violent ways to resolve disputes. The reverse seems to be true where Iraq is concerned. In 1990, Saddam Hussein, frustrated over Kuwait’s apparent theft of oil from Iraq fields and hoping to establish himself as the dominant power in the region, launched a surprise attack against his smaller neighbor. At the time, the Iraqi army was the forth largest in the world and was equipped with advanced tanks, artillery, and aircraft. The Iraqi army was also battle-hardened, having fought an eight-year war with Iran during the 1980s. Kuwait, for its part, had a reputation for arrogance borne of its extraordinary oil wealth. On the other hand, Kuwait’s military was small and ultimately ineffectual. Iraqi forces were able to overrun the small country in a matter of hours. Shortly after its victory, the Iraqi army began to mass on the border with Saudi Arabia, prompting consternation in this sometime US ally. Saudi Arabia’s government knew that its military would also not be a match for Iraq. Both governments chose to use their oil wealth primarily for other purposes besides full-scale militarization, perhaps in part because neither considered Iraq a particularly serious threat. After all, the only clear indication that war might be imminent, according to the chapter, was that roughly one month before the invasion the Iraqi government released statements indicating its intent to attack Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (see page 83). The two states chose not to enter into an arms race with Iraq. The result was that Saddam Hussein was undeterred from attacking them. One might argue that had Kuwait and Saudi Arabia matched Iraq’s military capability, they would have been spared the catastrophe they endured. But although they could certainly have been able to pay for large numbers of advanced weapons, they could not have matched the manpower Iraq was able to deploy. On the other hand, forming a military alliance with a superpower might have quickly balanced their military capacity relative to Iraq’s. Ultimately, this is precisely what took place, although this could not be considered an arms race according to our definition. In conclusion, these two cases show in different ways how the concept of arms race helps us understand international affairs. In the case of the U. S. and U. S. S. R. , although it proved costly and dangerous, the nuclear arms race night have prevented a direct military confrontation, and ultimately resolved itself once political conditions changed. On the other hand, the lack of an arms race in the Persian Gulf may have been a cause of the war that started in 1990. In other words, the implications of the lack of an arms race may be as dire as the alternative. Reference: Gray, Colin (1971) â€Å"The Arms Race Phenomenon,† World Politics vol. XXIV (October): 39-79.